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Abstract

Finite Gaussian Neurons:
Defending against adversarial attacks
by making neural networks say “I don’t know”
by
Felix Grezes

Advisor: Pr. Michael I. Mandel

Since 2014, artificial neural networks have been known to be vulnerable
to adversarial attacks, which can fool the network into producing wrong or
nonsensical outputs by making humanly imperceptible alterations to inputs.
While defenses against adversarial attacks have been proposed, they usually involve retraining a new neural network from scratch, a costly task.
In this work, I introduce the Finite Gaussian Neuron (FGN), a novel
neuron architecture for artificial neural networks1 .

1

The code used for this work is available at https://github.com/grezesf/
FGN---Research under the GPL 3.0 open source license. Work done with PyTorch.

v
My works aims to:
• easily convert existing models to Finite Gaussian Neuron architecture,
• while preserving the existing model’s behavior on real data,
• and offering resistance against adversarial attacks.
I show that converted and retrained Finite Gaussian Neural Networks
(FGNN) always have lower confidence (i.e., are not overconfident) in their
predictions over randomized and Fast Gradient Sign Method adversarial images when compared to classical neural networks, while maintaining high
accuracy and confidence over real MNIST images. To further validate the
capacity of Finite Gaussian Neurons to protect from adversarial attacks, I
compare the behavior of FGNs to that of Bayesian Neural Networks against
both randomized and adversarial images, and show how the behavior of the
two architectures differs. Finally I show some limitations of the FGN models
by testing them on the more complex SPEECHCOMMANDS task, against
the stronger Carlini-Wagner and Projected Gradient Descent adversarial attacks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Artificial neurons, first created as the Threshold Logic Unit by McCulloch
and Pitts (1943), made trainable as the perceptron by Rosenblatt (1958),
and integrated into practical artificial neural networks by Werbos (1975),
are a fundamental building block of modern machine learning and artificial
intelligence systems. Despite their success, artificial neural networks were
shown in 2014 to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks (Goodfellow et al.,
2014). These adversarial attack methods exploit unintuitive or misunderstood properties of high-dimensional vector spaces to generate adversarial
examples, i.e., carefully crafted inputs that are capable of fooling these networks. These adversarial examples are often indistinguishable from normal
inputs to humans. Defenses against adversarial attacks have been proposed
(survey by Akhtar and Mian (2018)), but are either computationally expensive as in the case of adversarial re-training (Madry et al., 2019), or do not
1
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generalize well to novel attacks as in the case of network distillation (Papernot et al., 2016; Carlini and Wagner, 2017). See section 1.2 for further
comparison with existing methods.
In this work I introduce the Finite Gaussian Neuron (FGN), a novel artificial neuron architecture that combines the classical artificial neuron with
an Gaussian component to restrict the neuron’s range of activity to a finite
area of the input space close to training samples. I show that artificial neural networks that incorporate the FGN architecture (FGNN) are resistant
to adversarial attacks, while exhibiting another desirable property: they are
naturally resistant to out of domain inputs. Furthermore, existing networks
can be converted to the FGN architecture without any expensive computation while preserving the network’s behavior over data.
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Motivation

There are two main intuitions that motivate the Finite Gaussian Neuron,
both of which might explain why neural networks are susceptible to adversarial attacks: the piece-wise linearity of the artificial neurons and the curse
of dimensionality.
Typically, artificial neural networks are built by combining artificial neurons into layers, and these neurons individually separate their input space
into linear contours, see Goodfellow et al. (2016). The combination of these
linear contours through stacked layers allow the network to output highly
complex and non-linear contours, but a consequence of this linear combination of linear separators is that neural networks tend to have excessive
confidence (Guo et al., 2017) in their output in regions of space far from
their training data, see figure 1.1. The curse of dimensionality refers to many
unintuitive phenomena that arise when analyzing data in high-dimensional
spaces, see (Zimek et al., 2012). Notably, distances become hard for humans
to visualize. Figure 1.2 gives a simplistic example. Other commonly referenced unintuitive phenomena are that high-dimensional spheres have most
of their volume concentrated near their surface, and that high-dimensional
data sets become easier to linearly separate, see (Beyer et al., 1999).
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Figure 1.1: A model trained to recognize MNIST digits (see section 3.1 for
model details) often makes strong predictions over random noise. For each
red square, this typical model’s softmax output gives over 0.5 confidence in
one of the ten digits, i.e., makes a confident prediction that digit is present
in the random image.
The combination of the piece-wise linearity of neural networks with the
various unintuitive curse of dimensionality phenomena lead to various unexpected behaviors of neural networks. For example Szegedy et al. (2013)
showed that the boundaries between the various classes in the hyper-space
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(as predicted by a neural network) are often linear and that most real inputs
are close distance-wise to every boundary. Figure 1.3 shows an example of
this behavior. These intuitions motivate the definition of the Finite Gaussian Neuron (in Section 2.2), as a combination of a classical neuron with a
Gaussian function of effectively finite support.

Figure 1.2: Three distinct images that all have the same Euclidean distance
to the image in the blue box. Human perception doesn’t always align with
mathematical definitions.
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Figure 1.3: What the simple MNIST model from Figure 1.1 predicts when
linearly interpolating between two images. Each pixel in these plots shows the
class predicted for an interpolated input MNIST image. The centre-leftmost
pixel and centre-rightmost pixel correspond to two images pulled from the
data in classes 8 (yellow) and 3 (red), respectively. Left-right movement along
the center corresponds to linear interpolation of the two images. Each vertical
axis corresponds to movement along a different random vector orthogonal to
the left-right image-to-image vector. Each color corresponds to an MNIST
class prediction. Surprisingly, while the two original images are correctly
classified as 8 and 3 respectively, orthogonal movement almost always leads
to a different class. An analogy would be: walking in a straight line from
Paris to Berlin predictably takes you from France to Germany, but any step
left or right of that straight line always lands outside of France or Germany.
This image is revisited in Section 3.1.4
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Related Work
Fast Gradient Sign Method

Goodfellow et al. (2014) introduce adversarial attacks via the Fast Gradient
Sign Method (FGSM) which take a fixed size ϵ step in the input space, using
gradient descent to find the direction that maximizes the network loss L over
the input x with true label t for model parameters θ.
FGSM adversary(x) = x + ϵ · sign(∇x (L(θ, x, t)).

(1.1)

Note that this is the opposite direction that is used in training the model and
that this is the untargeted version of the FGSM attack. The authors show
that continuous retraining of the model using adversarial examples protects
the model from these attacks. This adversarial training method however
is computationally expensive as it requires both creating new adversarial
examples after each training epoch and continuously retraining the model
with a growing dataset. They also show that adversarial training based
on the FGSM attack does not necessarily protect against other adversarial
attacks.
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Projected Gradient Descent

Pushing adversarial training further, Madry et al. (2019) propose a multistep variant of FGSM, which is called Projected Gradient Descent (PGD)
on the negative loss function. At each step s, the adversarial input as is
projected onto the constraining hyper-sphere using P, which is in itself an
optimization problem.
xs = Px,ϵ (as )
= Px,ϵ (xs−1 + α · sign(∇x (L(θ, x, t)))

(1.2)
(1.3)

In this case the constraint is the ℓ∞ ϵ-bounded hyper-sphere around the input
x, making the projection simple to compute, i.e. clip the values along each
of the i dimensions:
xs,i = min(xi + ϵ, max(xi − ϵ, as,i ))

(1.4)

The step size α is a tunable parameter of the attack, other parameters are
the same as for FGSM in equation 1.1.
By showing that many PGD attacks, starting from random points near
real inputs, end up in similar local maxima, the authors argue that PGD is
the strongest possible adversarial attack that relies on first order information
(information from the first derivative of the loss, i.e., the gradients). Neural
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network models retrained on these PGD adversarial examples are shown to be
robust to a variety of other first-order attacks. However these new adversarial
examples create more complex boundaries which require larger networks to
fit, making PGD-retraining a computationally expensive defense. In their
experiments,the authors increased the size of the networks 10-fold, and used
between 7 and 100 steps in the PGD attacks.

1.2.3

Distillation

Another proposed defense against adversarial attacks is Distillation, proposed
by Papernot et al. (2016). Originally designed by Hinton et al. (2015) as a
method to reduce the size of deep neural networks by transferring knowledge
from larger to smaller networks, distillation works by training a large network,
then using the output prediction vectors as soft-labels to train a smaller
network, encoding class similarities in the soft-labels. Instead of aiming to
reduce model size, Papernot et al. show that retraining the same model
on the soft-labels provides defense against adversarial attacks by making
the network less sensitive to small changes over the input, and requiring a
higher average minimum number of features to be modified in order to create
adversarial examples. Similarly to adversarial retraining, distillation requires
additional computation to generate the soft-labels and retrain the model.
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Radial Basis Function Networks

Radial Basis Function (RBF) networks have also been explored as a more
intrinsic defense against out of distribution data and adversarial attacks
(Moody and Darken, 1989; Chenou et al., 2019; Zadeh et al., 2018) and
in fact are similar in many ways to the FGNNs. Both change the neuron’s
architecture to limit its activity to a finite area of its input space. The output
y of an RBF neuron is usually defined as:
y=

N
X

wi ρ (∥x − ci ∥)

(1.5)

i

with x the input vector, N the number of dimensions of the input, ci the
centers attached to the network, and ρ the radial basis function, chosen such
that lim∥x∥→∞ ρ(x) = 0. The Euclidean norm is usually used. In contrast to
FGNs, RBFs cannot be created from an existing artificial neuron to mimic the
activity of that neuron (see section 2.3). RBFs have not become as popular as
other deep neural networks techniques, perhaps due to their complexity. The
RBF architecture doesn’t easily generalize to multiple layers, and requires
some pre-processing work to compute the centers based on the available
data. .
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Bayesian Neural Networks

Bayesian Neural Networks (BNN) introduced by MacKay (1992b,a) attach a
probability distribution to each weight and bias of the network and combine
them as an ensemble to avoid overconfidence that might be caused by a
particular selection of model parameters. BNNs estimate the probability
distribution over the weights w of the network that maximize the posterior
observations D = t1 , t2 , . . . tN
p(w|D, α, β) ∝ p(w|α)p(D|w, β −1 )

(1.6)

p(w|α) = N (w|0, α−1 I)

(1.7)

p(D|w, β) =

N
Y

N (tn |y(xn , w), β −1 )

(1.8)

n=1

with α, β the variance factors for the N Gaussian functions for the weights
and observations respectively. Bishop and Nasrabadi (2006) explain how
variational inference can be applied to BNNs to efficiently compute the weight
distribution estimation (Hinton and Van Camp, 1993; Barber and Bishop,
1998). BNNs have the capacity of making no predictions when presented
with random noise or inputs unrelated to the training data (Jospin et al.,
2022). BNNs have shown some resistance to adversarial attacks (Uchendu
et al., 2021). Comparison to FGNs is provided in section 3.2.

Chapter 2
The Finite Gaussian Neuron
2.1

The Classical Artificial Neuron

A classical artificial neuron’s output yc is defined by:
yc = φ(ℓ)
ℓ=

X

w i · xi

(2.1)
(2.2)

i

with ℓ being the linear component defined by a linear combination of the
inputs xi and associated weights wi , and with φ being the non-linear activation function required by the universal approximator theorem by Cybenko
(1989); Hornik et al. (1989). The bias term can be implicitly included as
an extra input with value 1 or explicitly included. We use the implicit bias
representation because it is cleaner. Figure 2.1 gives a visualization of this
classical neuron.

12
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Figure 2.1: A representation of the classical artificial neuron.

2.2

The Finite Gaussian Neuron

I now define the Finite Gaussian Neuron (FGN) as a combination of the
classical neuron’s activity with a Gaussian activity that limits the effective
support of the neuron. The desired outcome of the FGN definition is to restrict the activity of the neural network to regions of the input hyperspace
where data has been observed during training, while making no predictions
over regions never observed; with the overarching goal of building FGN networks that are more resistant to adversarial attacks compared to classical
networks.
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Explicitly, the FGN’s output yf is given by:
yf = φ(ℓ) · g
g = exp −

(2.3)
1 X
(xi − ci )2
2
σ i

!
(2.4)

with ℓ and φ the same as in Equations (2.2) and (2.1), i.e., the linear component and non-linear activation function respectively; and with g the new
Gaussian component, defined by a center with coordinates ci that position
the neuron in the input hyperspace, and variance σ that prevents the neuron’s activity from covering the entire input space. If inputs are far away
from the center, relative to the variance σ, then the Gaussian component g
approaches value zero and the FGN’s output activity will approach zero as
well, thus limiting the effective support of the neuron to a limited zone of
the input hyperspace. Figure 2.2 gives a visualization of the new Gaussian
component g. The following figures (2.3, 2.4) show the difference in behavior
between the classical neuron architecture and the FGN architecture, for an
arbitrary neuron, over a two dimensional input space.
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Figure 2.2: The Gaussian component of a Finite Gaussian Neuron

P
Figure 2.3: On the left, the ℓ = i wi xi linear component of the classical
neuron with weights W = [−1, −2, 5] (chosen arbitrarily), shown as an activity heatmap over a 2D input space. On the right the same neuron’s output
yc = tanh(ℓ) after passing the linear component through the tanh non-linear
activation function. The black line shows where the heatmap value is zero.
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P
Figure 2.4: On the left, the Gaussian component g = exp − σ12 i (xi − ci )2
of the FGN architecture with center C = [1, 2] (an arbitrary point on the zero
line in the image) and variance σ = 5 (value with both +1 and −1 activity
visible in the image), shown as an activity heatmap over a 2D input space.
The line in this image is only for comparison with the other images. On the
right, the FGN’s output yf = tanh(ℓ)·g combining the output of the classical
neuron with the Gaussian component. Note the limited effective support of
the FGN’s activity.

2.3

Classic Neuron Conversion to FGN

One important property of the FGN is that existing networks using the classical neuron can be converted to the FGN architecture without changing the
network’s behavior over a given dataset, and without heavy computation.
This is done by converting each classical neuron in the original network to
an FGN with identical weight vector W and large variance σ. Figure 2.5
illustrates this property. Converting a classical neuron to an FGN involves
defining two new parameters, the variance σ and the center ci . For any given
dataset, there will be a unique C = [ci ] that allows for minimum valued vari-
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Figure 2.5: Illustration showing that increasing an FGN’s variance σ (smallest top-left, largest bottom-right) leads to behavior identical to that of classical neuron with the same weights W . Note how the final picture is indistinguishable that shown in figure 2.3.
ance while not changing the behavior over this dataset. Finding this unique
center is the topic of future research. Currently, conversion is done by setting
the center C to be the point on the zero-output line (defined by the neuron
weights W ) closest to the origin, and empirically searching for a variance σ
large enough via unbounded exponential search.

2.4

Training the FGN

Training the FGN is done much the same way as the classical neuron: we find
parameters of the FGN that locally minimize a loss function using the backpropagation algorithm. So far, experiments have not shown any specific loss
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function (Mean-Squared Error, Cross-Entropy, etc. . . ) or gradient descent
optimizer algorithm (Adam, RMSprop, etc. . . ) to perform any differently
on FGNs versus classical neurons. Since one of the goals of the FGN is to
limit the activity far from the data, we add a regularization term weighted
by λ to any loss function L used to train the neuron. This additional term
adds pressure to minimize the variance σ during training, and λ becomes a
hyper-parameter to tune to the task like any other.
L = L̃ + λσ 2 .

(2.5)

The partial derivatives of the FGN output y for an input xi are:
Weights:

∂y
= xi φ′ (ℓ) · g
∂wi

∂y
2(xi − ci )
·g
= φ(ℓ) ·
∂ci
σ2
P
2 i (xi − ci )2
∂y
Sigma:
= φ(ℓ) ·
· g.
∂σ
σ3

Center:

(2.6)

(2.7)

(2.8)

The changes to each of the parameters all depend in part on the Gaussian
component g. In particular they all need it to be non-zero or they will not
change. This shows that the FGN can only learn when the input is close to
the neuron centers ci relative to the variance σ. Proper initialization is thus
important to ensure that the FGN variance and centers cover the data, else
the gradients will be non-existent. A simple initialization scheme, used in
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this work, is to empirically set the variances σ to be large enough such that
each FGN has some activity over the training data.
As a sanity check, We verify that a single FGN is able to be trained to
properly classify a two dimensional linearly separable toy dataset, shown in
figure 2.6. The following figures 2.7, 2.8 show the FGN’s weights W , center
ci and variance σ adapting to fit the data.

Figure 2.6: The 2D linearly separable toy data centered on (1, 1), and the
activity of the FGN over the space after training with MSE loss function,
λ = 0.01 variance σ regularization term, Adam optimizer with lr = 0.05.
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Figure 2.7: The FGN’s Gaussian component g activity over the 2D space
pre and post training. Initially centered on the origin (0, 0) with variance
σ = 5, after training the Gaussian component is centered on the data and
the variance has shrunk such that space far from the data has g = 0 activity.

2.5

Variants

Within the framework of the FGN, there are several modifications that may
improve the FGN’s performance on specific tasks. An FGN built to match
the behavior of a classical neuron will define the bias term of the linear
component ℓ by the centers of the FGN, so that the line of zero activity for the
linear component passes through the center. This isn’t strictly needed when
retraining the FGN or when training from scratch. Figure 2.9 is an example
of an FGN with decoupled bias and center in two dimensional input space.
All the experiments performed in later sections were done with decoupled
bias and center.
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Figure 2.8: Evolution of the FGN’s variance σ and center position during
training. On the left, pressured by the loss function’s regularizer term λ,
the variance σ shrinks as much as possible while still fitting the data. On
the right, the dotted blue line shows the FGN center’s path during training,
starting from the red dot in (0, 0) and moving towards the theoretically optimal center (1, 1) (black dot). The black line is the class border and the
orange line is the FGN’s predicted border, given by the weights W .
Since distances in higher dimensions behave counter-intuitively, various norms
for the Gaussian component g were considered over the Euclidean norm.


1
g = exp − 2 ∥xi − ci ∥p
σ


(2.9)

Figure 2.10 shows how changing the ordinal p of the norm affects the FGN’s
output, visualized over a two dimensional input space. Cursory experiments,
testing prediction accuracy and resistance to adversarial inputs, have not
shown any replicable differences in FGN performance between the various
p-norms. The Euclidean norm is used in subsequent chapters.
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Figure 2.9: Activity of an FGN with a decoupled bias and centers.

p = 0.5

p = 1.0

p = 3.0

Figure 2.10: Examples of how the p-norm of the FGN’s Gaussian component
affects activity.
The variance term σ, which defines how large or small the hyper-sphere of
activity is for the Gaussian component g, can be modified into a matrix Σ
to stretch and/or rotate the sphere into an ellipse, which gives the FGN a
different variance along each of its inputs. The Gaussian component g then
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Full Σ

Figure 2.11: Examples of how using a covariance Σ matrix, rather than a
scalar value σ, allows the FGN to consider changes along one input dimension
to be more important than others.
becomes:
g = exp −(X − C)T Σ−1 (X − C)



(2.10)

with X = [xi ] the inputs vector, C = [ci ] the center vector and Σ the covariance matrix (positive semi-definite). Figure 2.11 gives examples of such
Σ matrices. Note that a full Σ matrix has N 2 elements, with N being the
number of inputs to the FGN, making the computation of g challenging for
larger problem. A diagonal Σ matrix is feasible; more memory is required
to store the variance vector, but the same number of scalar multiplications
is done, except with different scalars instead of the same variance for each
FGN input.
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Multi-Layer FGN Networks

Extending the FGN architecture to neural networks is straightforward save
for one detail: the Gaussian component g of an FGN needs to consider
the Gaussian components of its input from the previous layer to be able to
propagate out-of-range activities. Without this Gaussian gate, only the first
layer has zero activity far from the data, and subsequent layer activity far
from the data defaults to the FGN bias, not necessarily to zero as desired,
as shown in figure 2.16.
The output y of the j-th FGN layer in a FGNN is:
!
y = φ(ℓ) · g = φ

X

xi w i

·g

(2.11)

i

1 X
g = max(Gj−1 ) · exp − 2
(xi − ci )2
σ i

!
(2.12)

With xi and Gj−1 the previous layer outputs and Gaussian components. For
the initial layer, max(Gj−1 ) should be set to 1. Figure 2.12 illustrates this
process.
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Figure 2.12: Illustration of an FGN’s output computation when integrated
in a neural network. The added Gaussian gate allows for zero activity due
to out-of-range inputs to propagate throughout the network. Both y ang g
are outputed to the next layer.
To illustrate the difference in behavior between a neural network built
from classical neurons compared to a network built from FGNs, consider
the two class, two dimensional, non-linearly separable toy dataset in figure
2.13. After training two fully-connected feedforward neural networks, one
with FGNs and the other with classical neurons but otherwise identical,
figure 2.14 shows that, while both networks are able to properly separate the
two classes, the FGNN restricts its predictions to zones of the space where
the data is present, while the classical network does not. Figure 2.15 gives
additional details on the experiment.
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Figure 2.13: Two class, two dimensional, non-linearly separable toy dataset

Figure 2.14: Comparison of the activity heatmap between a classical neural
network (left) and the same network using FGNs instead of classical neurons
(right). Both networks separate the data shown in figure 2.13, but only the
classical network makes predictions far from the data.
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Table 2.1: Network parameters

Neurons in hidden layers
Dropout rate
p-norm
Variance
First FGN layer center initialization

Classic vs FGN training accuracies

32-16
1/16
2
Spherical
Random data points

Changes to the FGNN’s variances

Figure 2.15: For this toy problem, the FGN has better accuracy than the
classic model. The plot on the right show how the range of the neurons in
the final layer (variance σ 2 ) changes during training, most of them shrinking
under the added loss pressure shown in 2.5
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Figure 2.16: The activity heatmap of the FGNN when the Gaussian gate is
missing. All activity far from the data goes to the same value, but it is not
guaranteed to be zero. In this case it has converged to 0.8.

Chapter 3
Experimental Results
3.1

FGNNs over MNIST

3.1.1

Experimental Setup

With the behavior of FGNNs verified on toy data, we now test it on real
data, with the goal of providing defense against adversarial attacks. The
first dataset tested is MNIST, a collection of handwritten digit images LeCun
(1998). Three networks will be compared:
• A network trained over MNIST for 50 epochs, built with two fullyconnected layers of 64 classical neurons each, with dropout layers with
drop rate 0.2 in between each layer, and with a softmax output layer.
• A network built from FGNs directly converted from the classic network
above, with no retraining, and with a variance σ = 10 large enough to
not modify the behavior over the training data.
29
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• The same FGNN as above, retrained over the data for a single epoch
with a tiny λ = 10−10 loss pressure to shrink the variances σ.
All three networks have over 99% accuracy over the training data and over
97% over the validation data. The specific network design choices (size and
number of layers) are not relevant to the conclusions drawn, as other designs
were tested with similar experimental results.

3.1.2

Behavior over Random Images

The three networks were tested over two sets of randomized images: one built
from images with fully randomized pixel values, which have different mean
and variance compared MNIST; and the other built from images consisting
of shuffled MNIST images, in which the pixel values are maintained but
randomly rearranged, which preserve the mean and variance. Figure 3.1
shows image samples from these two sets.
Not only does the classical network have a high accuracy, it also has a high
confidence in its predictions (defined as the maximum value of the softmax
function over its output dimensions Y , i.e, softmax(Yi ) = exp(Yi )/

P

k

exp(Yk )).

Over the validation set, over 99% of its predictions gave one of the ten digit
classes a confidence greater that 0.5, i.e., a majority confidence over all the
other classes. In fact most of the predictions are well into the [0.9, 1.0] con-
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Shuffled MNIST image

Figure 3.1: Samples from the two randomized images datasets.

Figure 3.2: Histogram of confidences - classic network on MNIST.
fidence range, as shown by figure 3.2.
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Over 78% of confidences > 0.5

Figure 3.3: Histogram of confidences - classic network on random noise
When the same network is tested over the randomized images sets, the
histograms of confidences in Figure 3.3 show that a majority of predictions
still have above 0.5 confidence, even though the randomized images are far
away in the high dimensional hyper-space from the MNIST images. Figure
3.4 shows examples of randomized images, highlighting for illustration purposes those given an MNIST digit class with over 0.9 confidence. This is a
replication of results from Szegedy et al. (2013).
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Figure 3.4: Sample over-confident predictions made by the classic network.
For each red square, one of the model’s softmax outputs is above 0.9 i.e the
model is highly confident in its prediction for that image. There are no visible
blue squares which would indicate a maximum softmax output below 0.2 for
that image, i.e. the model being close to saying “I don’t know”. The values
0.9 and 0.2 were selected for illustration purposes and do not hold intrinsic
meaning.
Corresponding histograms for the converted FGNN are shown in Figure
3.5 and 3.6. By design, the converted FGNN does not modify the behavior of
the classic network over the MNIST training data. It outputs identical values
and the histogram of its prediction confidences over the validation data looks
identical to that of classic network. By contrast, when the converted FGN
network is tested over the randomized images sets, the histograms are shifted
towards lower values, with fewer confident predictions.
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Figure 3.5: Histogram of confidences - converted FGNN on MNIST.

0.0% of confidences > 0.5

Over 43% of confidences > 0.5

Figure 3.6: Histogram of confidences - converted FGNN on random noise
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Finally, the FGNN is retrained over MNIST for a single epoch. The
pressure to shrink the variances σ of the network’s FNGs, added to the
loss function, was a λ = 10−10 . The overall accuracy remains the same
(99% over training data and 97% over validation data) and still the network
outputs extremely confident predictions over MNIST images. The figure 3.7
is functionally identical to 3.2. But when this network is tested over the
randomized image sets, almost all the predictions are at 0.1, as shown in
figure 3.8, meaning the retrained FGN network’s softmax output is actually
all zeros, and making no prediction for these randomized images that are
far away in the high dimensional hyper-space from the MNIST images. The
retrained FGNN is restricting its activity exclusively to zones of the hyperspace in which the training data are present. These zones are still large
enough to generalize from the training data to the validation data. With a
value of λ = 10−10 , the overall loss increased by under 0.05%. By comparison
the l2-regularization factor of 10−5 adds ∼10%), indicating that the variance
σ shrinkage can be a lower priority task than the prediction accuracy and
classical l2 weight regularization while still being effective at limiting the
range of the FGNN. Retraining for a single epoch compared to the classical
networks initial 50 epochs shows that only a fraction of the original works
needs to added for an effective FGNN to be trained.
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Figure 3.7: Histogram of confidences - retrained FGNN network.

0.0% of of confidences > 0.5

0.0% of confidences > 0.5

Figure 3.8: Histogram of confidences - retrained FGNN on MNIST
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83% of confidences > 0.5

Figure 3.9: Histogram of confidences - classic and FGNNs on EMNIST
To explore why FGNNs can generalize from training to validation dataset
while still rejecting randomly generated images, the three networks are tested
on the EMNIST dataset, a collection of handwritten letter images by Cohen
et al. (2017). The histograms of the prediction confidences are shown in
figure 3.9. These networks were not retrained and do not aim to classify
EMNIST images properly. Unlike over random images, classic and FGNNs
behave similarly, with only some images being rejected as out-of-domain by
the retrained FGNN. This suggests that FGNs do not simply restrict activity to areas close to training samples, but instead that the hyper-surface of
non-zero activity needed to cover the training samples, defined by the smallest variances σ possible, also cover both the validation data, and naturally
generated yet out-of-domain samples. Samples images are shown in figure
3.10.
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Figure 3.10: Sample EMNIST images with their prediction confidences given
by the different networks. Images of the letter O are identified as a digit 0
with high confidence by all networks, but other images are also assigned a
high confidence prediction. Only the retrained FGNN rejects some images
as out-of-domain.

3.1.3

Protection against FGSM attack

While protection from out-of-domain predictions is a useful feature of FGNNs,
it does not guarantee protection from adversarial attacks. To verify this, the
networks were tested against the untargeted FGSM attack first introduced
by Goodfellow et al. (2014), which generates adversarial examples by taking
a single fixed-size step in the opposite direction of the gradient of the loss
with regards to the input image and the true image label (see 1.1). To be
considered successful an attack must not only change the class of the prediction outputted by the network for this input from correct to incorrect, but
also have a confidence in the incorrect class above 0.5 (i.e., the network has
stronger confidence in this class than all others combined). The untargeted
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version of the attack was chosen for its simplicity.
A parameter of the FGSM attack is ϵ, the size of the fixed-length step,
which also corresponds to the maximum amount of distortion allowed to
the original image. Larger ϵ leads to a larger number of successful attacks,
but makes the added adversarial noise more noticeable to a human observer.
The smallest ϵ tested is equal to the smallest change possible to an 8-bit
pixel. In addition to the three networks previously described in Chapter
3 (the classical network, the converted FGNN, and the retrained FGNN),
a fourth network is tested against FGSM. This network is built from the
converted FGNN and is retrained for 100 epochs, the same number of epochs
used to train the classical network, and with a much larger pressure λ =
10.0 to shrink the variances σ of the FGNs added to the loss. This longretrained FGNN maintains a 99%/97% accuracy during training/validation,
with a high confidence in its predictions over MNIST. The FGSM attack was
run over the 10,000 images from the MNIST validation set. Examples of
adversarial images are show in figure 3.11.
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Figure 3.11: An MNIST image and the adversarial images produced by the
FGSM attack on the classic network, for various values of step-size ϵ

Figure 3.12: Count of successful FGSM attacks (changes the class from correct to incorrect, confidence > 0.5) among the 10K MNIST validation set
images.
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Figure 3.12 show the count of successful FGSM attacks per epsilon, over
the 10K MNIST validation set images. The lower the count, the more the
network is considered robust to adversarial attacks. The results show that
FGNNs are more resistant to the FGSM adversarial attack than the classic
network. The long-retrained FGNN appears to be impervious to the FGSM
attack even for small ϵ, while the classical network remains vulnerable to attacks no matter the ϵ value. For both the converted and the quick-retrained
FGN networks, smaller ϵ values still allow for a comparable number of successful attacks as the classical network, but past a certain ϵ value are no
longer vulnerable to the FGSM attack. Taking a closer look, all the outputs
of the FGNNs on the adversarial images in the cases with no successful attacks are zeros, indicating that these adversarial images are falling outside of
the range of these networks’ internal FGNs. Figure 3.13 shows the evolution
of the confidence in the adversarial predictions as ϵ increases.

CHAPTER 3. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

42

Figure 3.13: Histograms of the confidences in the predictions over FGSM
adversarial images for the classical network, the converted FGN network,
and the long-retrained network. For ϵ = 0 the adversarial images are the
same as the MNIST images and the networks output predictions with high
confidence. For any non-zero ϵ, the long-retrained FGNN outputs all zeros,
while the classical network outputs high confidences. As ϵ increases, the converted FGN network starts behaving differently from the classical network,
outputting lower confidences, until it matches the long-retrained FGN network and outputs all zeros.

3.1.4

Observations

These results indicate that FGNNs offer some protection from FGSM attacks.
They seem to avoid overfitting, generalizing from training data to validation
data, while making no predictions on adversarial images. To explore this
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seemingly contradictory phenomenon, following Goodfellow et al. (2016) we
visualize the decisions of these networks over various low dimensional manifolds in the high dimensional input space. Figure 3.14 plots two dimensional
cross-sections of the 784 dimensional MNIST image space, filling the space
with colors associated with digit classes as predicted by the networks. The
images show the prediction on an MNIST image at the center, moving along
the FGSM attack vector to the right, and a randomly chosen vector orthogonal to the attack vector up. The half-width of the cross section was chosen
to be ϵ = 0.06 as that is when the classical network and converted FGN
network start behaving differently.
For the classical network, boundaries between the original predicted class
and every other class are present, indicating the existence of many adversarial
examples within the ϵ-hypersphere around the image. The converted FGNN
exhibits the same boundaries but with weaker confidence as we move away
from the original image, making adversarial examples rarer. And the longretrained FGNN makes no predictions anywhere except at the original image,
making adversarial examples non-existent.
The lack of predictions around the MNIST image by the long-retrained
FGNN seems to imply that the model is overfitting to the training data,
but the high accuracy on the validation data already contradicts this. Fig-
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Figure 3.14: Boundaries between predicted classes in the hyper-space around
an MNIST example for the classical network, the converted FGNN and the
long-retrained FGNN. Each small image is square 2D cross-section of the
hyperspace, defined by an MNIST image at the center, the FGSM attack
vector on the horizontal axis, and a random orthogonal vector on the vertical
axis. The images are 2ϵ wide. Each pixel is colored by the predicted class,
with higher color intensity for higher confidence. This is example shows a
digit 3 adversarially transformed into a digit 5 for the classical network and
converted FGN network.1
ure 3.15, which plots cross-sections of the hyperspace while moving from
one MNIST image to another, shows that both FGNNs make predictions
continuously along the image-to-image vector, and rarely nearby, while the
classical network makes confident predictions over the entire nearby space.
It’s notable that there are no areas of zero-valued predictions in between the
images.

1

Larger version of images are available in the addendum.
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Figure 3.15: Boundaries between predicted classes in the hyper-space between to MNIST images for the classical network, the converted FGNN, and
the long-retrained FGNN. Each small image is a square 2D cross-section of
the hyperspace, defined by a vector from one MNIST image at the leftmost
center pixel to another MNIST image a the rightmost center pixel, and a
random orthogonal vector on the vertical axis. Each pixel is colored by the
predicted class, with higher color intensity for higher confidence. This example shows a digit 8 linearly transformed into a digit 4.

3.2

Comparison to Bayesian Neural Networks

Because FGNNs were designed to not output any predictions over samples
far from the training data, it makes sense to compare them another technique with a similar property: Bayesian Neural Networks (BNNs). BNNs
attach a probability distribution to the model parameters, in our case the
weights and biases of the underlying neural net, and use samples weight values to make predictions. To produce a prediction, multiple forward passes
are computed, each with a new sampled set of weights and biases. Instead
of a single set of output values (in our case, softmaxes associated with one of
the ten MNIST digit classes), multiple sets are computed which represent a
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probability distribution over output values. From these distribution we can
estimate confidence and uncertainty in each output class. The properties lead
to BNNs being able to say “I don’t know.”. A review of BNN theory and
practical training methods can be found in (Wong et al., 2020) and (Jospin
et al., 2022). We use the Pyro toolbox (Bingham et al., 2019)2 to implement
BNNs.

3.2.1

BNNs over random images

To evaluate the behavior of a BNN over random noise, and to look at its
resistance against FGSM adversarial images, the architecture of the classical
model trained in Section 3.1 (2 fully-connected layers of 64 classical neurons
each) were used as the base for a BNN trained until it reached similar accuracy on the validation set (approximately 97%). Retraining the BNN to
reach this accuracy took significantly more epochs, 5000 on average vs 100
for the classical and FGN networks. Figure 3.16 shows the histograms of the
outputs of the BNN after sampling from the weight distributions 100 times,
for a given MNIST image.

2

Available at https://github.com/pyro-ppl/pyro
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Figure 3.16: The histograms of the log-softmax of the BNN outputs at each
digit class, over the 100 weight samplings. The number above each histogram
is the median probability given by the BNN for that digit. The histogram is
colored yellow if this median probability is above 0.5

Figure 3.17: Examples of images rejected by the BNN and their associated
histograms.
When the BNN is allowed to reject images in which none of the median values of the histograms surpass 0.2, the accuracy over the non-rejected
images goes up to 98% over the accepted images, and approximately 2% of
images are rejected (about 200 out of the 10000 in the validation set). Figure
3.17 shows examples of rejected images.
Just like the classical neural network, the BNN is highly confident in its
predictions: over 95% of its predictions gave one of the ten digit classes a
confidence greater that 0.5, and the histogram of these predictions, shown
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Figure 3.18: Histogram of confidences over MNIST validation set - Bayesian
Neural Network.
in figure 3.18 looks indistinguishable from the classical neural network’s histogram shown in figure 3.2 When evaluated over the fully random and shuffled
random datasets described in Section 3.1, the BNN behaves much better than
the classical neural network. On both datasets only 6-7% of random images
produce a confidence greater that 0.5. The histograms are shown in Figure
3.19. In contrast to FGNNs, where a model re-trained for a single epoch was
able to reject every random image as out-of-domain (c.f., Figure 3.8), the
BNN still accepts a small but measurable number of random images.
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6% of confidences > 0.5

Figure 3.19: Histogram of confidences over random noise - Bayesian Neural
Network.

3.2.2

BNN over adversarial images from FGSM

Finally, the adversarial images produced by the FGSM attack on the BNN’s
corresponding classic neural network (the same that were produced for figure 3.1.3), over the 10K MNIST validation set images, were transferred and
tested on the BNN. Successful attacks per epsilon are shown in figure 3.20.
The BNN proved extremely resilient, not allowing any successful attacks
(changes the class, confidence > 0.5) until the allowed distortion was over
1/32 of the maximum pixel range (ϵ > 0.152). This behavior contrasts with
that of FGNNs. The FGNNs that were simply converted, or retrained for a
single epoch, were vulnerable to attacks with small epsilon, but eventually
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Figure 3.20: Count of successful FGSM attacks (changes the class, confidence > 0.5) among the 10K MNIST validation set images for the Bayesian
neural network, and the classic and FGN networks.
rejected every adversarial images as out-of-domain for larger distortions.
The difference in behavior over adversarial images of BNNs compared to
FGNNs can also be seen in the histograms of their prediction confidences
(the maximum softmax of their outputs) over the varying epsilons, shown
in figure 3.21. While the BNN eventually rejects more adversarial images
than the classical neural network, it never matches the FGNNs and outputs
all zeros as shown in figure 3.13. It’s notable that the BNN’s histogram for
maximally distorted adversarial images (ϵ = 3.246) still shows many highly
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Figure 3.21: Histograms of the confidences in the predictions over FGSM
adversarial images for the classical network and the converted and retrained
BNN network. While the BNN eventually rejects more adversarial images
than the classical neural network, it never matches the FGNNs and outputs
all zeros as shown in figure 3.13.
confident predictions, even though the BNN’s histogram over random images
shows few such high confidences (fig 3.2.1). This validates the finding of
Goodfellow et al. (2014) that adversarial images are not random noise.
Combining the above results, we conclude that FGNNs and BNNs defend
against FGSM adversarial images through different mechanisms. FGNNs do
not distinguish between only slightly distorted adversarial images and normal
images unless retrained for a long time, in which case the image is rejected
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entirely and not recognized as any class. However they will always reject
images that are distorted past a threshold. Meanwhile BNNs exhibit the
opposite behavior. They can correctly recognize adversarial images that are
only slightly distorted, but cannot reject highly distorted images. It should
also be noted that FGNNs and BNNs differ in how they add additional computational complexity to the networks. FGNs require the computation of the
Gaussian component of each neuron, and optionally extra training epochs;
while BNNs require extra training, and multiple samplings per forward pass.

3.3

Convolutional FGNs over SPEECHCOMMANDS

The results above indicate that FGNNs provide certain neural networks with
resistance to certain adversarial attacks, but to further validate their usefulness, FGNNs still need to be tested on on datasets other than MNIST, with
a network architecture other that feedforward, against attacks other than
FGSM.

3.3.1

Description of the Data and Models

The SPEECHCOMMANDS dataset by Warden (2018) consists of over 100 000
one-second long utterances of 30 short words from different speakers. The
recordings are provided as wav files sampled at 16 kHz. The words were cho-
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sen to be a mix of potential commands (‘up’, ‘down’), numbers, and common
words that could confuse the model (‘tree’, ‘dog’). This dataset was chosen
to contrast audio against MNIST’s visual data, and for the relative simplicity
of its audio task. Isolated keyword detection directly relates to the output
layer of the neural network, whereas other tasks might require upstream and
downstream audio processing unrelated to the testing of the neural network
against adversarial attacks. For example continuous text-to-speech models
might change word predictions based on prior probabilities estimated by a
language model, which fall outside the scope of analyzing an attack on a specific neural network. Though in the last decade, large attention-based models
Bahdanau et al. (2016) have demonstrated that neural networks are capable of end-to-end automatic speech recognition, highlighting the importance
of understanding how such large networks respond to adversarial attacks,
without needed to attack each different subsystem separately.
The neural networks trained on the SPEECHCOMMANDS tasks were
modeled after the M5 architecture by Dai et al. (2017). This architecture
was chosen because of its reported performance on the task (71% accuracy,
state of the art at the time, though we achieve over 80%), the presence of
convolutional layers within the network, and the PyTorch library’s providing
open-source code for the training of such networks. Convolutional layers have
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proven themselves to be one of the most useful neural network layer variants,
especially since Alex Krizhevsky et. al. Krizhevsky et al. (2012) used them
to win the 2012 ImageNet challenge by over 10 percentage points. Current
state of the art on this task reaches around 97-98%, as reported by Vygon
and Mikhaylovskiy (2021).
A single one dimensional convolution layer is essentially one neuron slid
across the input vector according to the kernel size, stride and dilation parameters. As such, a convolutional layer of classical neurons can be converted
to FGN neurons in the same way described in section 2.3. For a convolutional
FGN layer with neuron weights W = [w0 , w1 . . . wk ], centers C = [c0 , c1 , . . . ck ]
and variance σ; with convolutional parameters stride s, kernel size k and dilation d; the i-th value of output Y for an input vector X of length n, is:
Yi = φ(ℓi ) · gi
ℓi =

K
X

(3.1)

wk · Zik

(3.2)

k=0
K
1 X
gi = exp − 2
(Zik − Ck )2
σ k=0

!

Zik = X(i+k)(s+d)

(3.3)
(3.4)

The size of the output Y is ⌊1 + (n − d(k − 1) − 1)/s⌋.
Similarly to the experiment on MNIST, a total of five networks were
created: the original M5 network with classic neurons trained for 21 epochs,
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an FGNN with weights simply converted from the original network without
any additional training, the same converted FGNN trained for 1 epoch, the
same converted FGNN trained for 21 epochs, and an FGNN trained from
scratch for 21 epochs. Though the goal is not to obtain state of the art
performance on the task, it is important that all networks perform similarly
to be able to compare their resistance to adversarial attacks. All networks fall
within the 87-92% and 84-86% accuracy ranges on the training and testing
sets respectively, and all networks show high confidence in their predictions
(shown in figure 3.22). Note that because the converted FGNN does not
change the behavior of the classic network on SPEECHCOMMANDS data,
their histograms are identical, and thus only one is shown.
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Over 90% of confidences > 0.5

Over 93% of confidences > 0.5
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Figure 3.22: Histogram of confidences of the networks on the SPEECHCOMMANDS validation dataset
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Behavior over White Noise

In an experiment similar to that described in section 3.1.2, the 5 networks
were tested on white noise. The results are shown in figure 3.23 (The histogram of confidences of the converted FGNN with no retraining is identical
to that of the classic network, and is not shown). As expected based on the
results over MNIST, the classic network still makes a substantial amount of
confident predictions even though the inputs are completely random. Meanwhile the two FGNN that have been retrained for 21 epochs show essentially
no confident predictions. However unlike the MNIST results, the FGNN retrained for a single epoch does make confident predictions, indicating that the
variances σ define an area of the input space with non-zero activity still large
enough to cover all the generated white noise, and that method of initializing
the FGNN covariance parameters during conversion could be improved. The
numerical values of the white noise generated for this experiment fell within
the minimum and maximum bounds of the sound samples of the training
dataset. In a quick follow-up experiment, these minimum and maximum
numerical bounds were expanded by 106 , meaning that the networks were
given inputs with some values never seen during training. In this case the
classic network made 100% of predictions with confidence over 0.5, while ev-
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ery FGNN, including the one converted FGNN with no retraining and the
converted FGNN retrained for 1 epoch, only made null predictions. This
result shows that the FGNN does have an limited area of the input space
with non-zero activity, while the classic network does not.
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Over 63% of confidences > 0.5

Over 76% of confidences > 0.5

Under 1% of confidences > 0.5

0% of confidences > 0.5

Figure 3.23: Histogram of confidences of the networks over white noise
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Protection against Attacks

The two attacks chosen to test the networks resistance were the CarliniWagner attack (Carlini and Wagner, 2017) and the projected gradient descent (PGD) attack (Madry et al., 2019). PGD can be easily understood as
an iterative version of the FGSM attack, taking multiple steps along the adversarial gradient, while staying within the constraint boundaries after each
step (see equation 1.3). Based on their experimental results, investigating
the landscape of local maxima for multiple starting points of the attacks,
Madry et al. (2019) argue that PGD is in a sense the “ultimate” first-order
adversarial attack, which is why it was chosen to test FGNs.
The Carlini-Wagner (CW) attack was designed to minimize a loss function
that was found to empirically produce strong adversarial examples, picked
from several candidates Carlini and Wagner found promising. Given input x
with model output vector y as logits, pick a target class t̂ (different than the
real class for x) and search using gradient descent for the adversarial w that
minimizes:
1
w=
(tanh(w) + 1) − x
2

2


+c·f

2

1
(tanh(w) + 1)
2



(3.5)

with f (x) = max max(yi : i ̸= t̂) − yt̂

(3.6)

such that ∥w∥2 < ϵ

(3.7)
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The constant c controls attack success probability vs distance to x trade-off.
As in the original paper (Carlini and Wagner, 2017), binary search was used
to find the optimal value of c per attack attempt.
In our experiment, we applied the CW and PGD attacks with varying
epsilon parameters. In the CW attack, the epsilon value defines the maximum
distortion allowed measured by L2 distance with the original sample, whereas
in the PGD attack, epsilon defines the step size (1/30 of epsilon) taken during
each iteration of PGD, for a maximum of 50 steps.
Figure 3.24 shows the number of successful Carlini-Wagner attacks per
epsilon. Notably, all FGNN perform better than the original classic model,
except for the converted FGNN that was re-trained for 21 epochs. This perplexing result is difficult to explain and warrants further exploration. Unlike
the FGSM attacks on MNIST, FGNN do not eventually reject every sample,
for realistic epsilon values.
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Figure 3.24: Count of successful Carlini-Wagner attacks (changes the class,
confidence > 0.5) per epsilon among the 10K SPEECHCOMMANDS validation audio samples.
Figure 3.25 shows the results of the PGD attack. Finally, unlike in previous experiments, the adversarial attack was strong enough to fool the FGN
networks as reliably as the classic model.
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Figure 3.25: Count of successful Projected Gradient Descent attacks (changes
the class, confidence > 0.5) per epsilon among the 10K SPEECHCOMMANDS validation audio samples.
To further explore the differences and similarity of behaviors, figure 3.26
shows the histograms of confidences of the classic and FGN networks on the
adversarial samples for both the Carlini-Wagner and the PGD attacks.
For the Carlini-Wagner attack, the two FGNNs with the smallest amount
of retraining have the highest confidence in their adversarial predictions, but
those are the two networks with the lowest successful adversarial count as
seen in 3.24, indicating that the adversarial examples generated by the attack
fail to change the class of the original sample. By contrast, FGNNs that

CHAPTER 3. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

64

have been trained or retrained for longer behave more similarly to the classic
network.
In contrast, for the PGD attack, the two FGNNs that behave differently
than the classic network are the converted models with no and long retraining. The highest possible confidence in the successful adversarial samples
shown by those two networks could indicates that the FGN architecture actually helps the PGD attack, however this is not corroborated by the behavior
of the FGNN converted and trained for a single epoch or the FGNN trained
from scratch.
Further statistical analysis of the differences between adversarial examples created from classic and FGN networks, such as distribution of distances
between original and associated adversarial example, or separating the histograms between the different types of unsuccessful attacks (failed to change
the class vs failed to produce high confidence), could help shed further light
on the differences in behavior between the models and the failure to defend
against the PGD attack. Testing across multiple model training runs is also
needed to verify that the behaviors are not model specific.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, the novel Finite Gaussian Neuron architecture is introduced
by adapting Radial Basis Function networks to multiple-layers that can be
trained using back-propagation.
We find that FGNs are an effective tool for building artificial neural networks that do not make false-positive predictions over random-valued inputs. Furthermore, networks built using FGNs are shown to protect against
the FGSM adversarial attack, comparing favorably to the existing defense
of Bayesian neural networks, and offer some resistance against the CarliniWagner attack.
A unique property of FGNNs, when compared to other adversarial defenses, is that an existing feed-forward or convolutional neural network can
be converted to the FGN architecture without requiring re-training of the
network while maintaining identical behavior. Our finding also shows that
66
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this conversion increases the resistance of the network to adversarial attacks.
By design, re-training FGNNs increases their resistance to random inputs.
While retraining also increases their resistance to the FGSM attack, it seems
to be detrimental to defending against the more complex Carlini-Wagner
attack. This counter-intuitive behavior should be explored in future work.
The behavior of FGNNs in the context of high-dimensional vector spaces
also warrants further investigation. How are properly trained FGNs in section 3.1 able to generalize to unseen real images correctly while being able
to avoid making predictions over random images? Why are the class boundaries shown in section 3.1.4 such that FGNNs make predictions in between
MNIST image but not around them? FGNs put into question the reliance
of neural networks on the artificial neuron’s piece-wise linearity, and invite
more research in trainable non-linear neuronal architectures.
We also show that FGNs do not provide defense against the stronger adversarial PGD attack. Exploring how FGNs behave in other settings (blackbox attacks, adversarial attack transferability) also warrants further investigation. The strength of the PGD attack suggests that changes artificial
neuron’s architecture will not be enough to protect from adversarial attacks.
Finally FGNs highlight the flexibility of back-propagation algorithm in
training neural network variants with specific requirements.
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Larger version of images in figure 3.14. Boundaries between predicted classes
in the hyper-space around an MNIST example for the classical network.
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Larger version of images in figure 3.14. Boundaries between predicted classes
in the hyper-space around an MNIST example for the converted FGNN network.
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Larger version of images in figure 3.14.Boundaries between predicted classes
in the hyper-space around an MNIST example for the long-retrained FGNN
network.
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Larger version of images in figure 3.15. Boundaries between predicted classes
in the hyper-space in between two MNIST images for the classical network.
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Larger version of images in figure 3.15. Boundaries between predicted classes
in the hyper-space in between two MNIST images for the converted FGNN
network.
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Larger version of images in figure 3.15. Boundaries between predicted classes
in the hyper-space in between two MNIST images for the long-retrained
FGNN network.
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